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FACTOR EFFICIENCY IN PAKISTANI INDUSTRY: 
THE INFLUENCE OF PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
IN AFFECTING CAPITAL AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
by 
ROBERT E. LOONEY * 
Introduction 
Pakistan's recent fascination with privatization stems from two 
sources: external and internal. External influences are largely associated 
with the increased role of the International Monetary Fund in the country's 
policy making decision process. Internal pressures for privatization are from 
three main sources. 
First concerns the fiscal situation. ·Government defidts have been a 
growing problem in recent years and the conventional wisdom has been that 
in large part these deficits have stemmed from losses accrued by public 
enterprises. As a result, the perception has developed that a privatization 
program may go some way to relieving fiscal pressure. 
The second source of internal pressure concerns ideology with respect 
to the role of the state. The emphasis of economic thinking in the late 1980s 
was on issues such as government failure and the power of the market. In 
such an ideological environment, the inclination of advisers is to roll back 
the power of the state and privatization is seen by some as the tool to 
achieve that objective. This view also gains some support from elements in 
the current theological debate about what an Islamic economic system 
should look like. The third source of pressure comes from the business 
community who sense the ~pportunity of making a financial killing on the 
transaction. • 
In general, however, most economists reject both total public sector 
domination of production and complete laissez faire. The critical issue is not 
* Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (U.S.A.). 
450 ROBERT E. LOONEY 
one of privatization or public ownership per se, but, particularly in the case 
of manufacturing, where to draw the demarcation line between the two. 
What should best be left to the public sector and what to privatize. 
While the issues surrounding the areas to privatize will ultimately be 
determined by political considerations, there are nevertheless some general 
economic considerations that policy makers ought to consider as they pro-
ceed in restructuring the economy. In particular are private firms in Pakista-
ni industry more efficient than their counterparts in the public sector and if 
so in what regard? Are efficiency differences between state and private 
firms likely to be large or modest? Do efficiency differences between state 
and private firms hold across a wide number of industries or are they 
confined to several segments of manufacturing? Are the observed efficiency 
differentials confined to better utilization of capital or labor or both? What 
role do factors such as firm size and regional location play in affecting the 
productivity of capital and labor? 
Privatization and Efficiency 
Increased reliance on market forces in developing countries has be-
come the conventional wisdom in development economics. The reasons be-
hind this are varied and include: 1 
1. An intellectual belief, particularly held by economists in the superior attributes 
of markets versus government central planning regimes and government (public) 
ownership. 
2. The observed inefficiency of state-owned enterprises in developing countries. 
3. The success of the NICs, especially those of Asia (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore and Korea) which are perceived to have relied more on market forces than 
other developing countries. 
4. The growth performance of Japan since World War II, where again the percep-
tion is one of market reliance. 
5. A spill-over effect of conservative political tide which has swept many devel-
oped countries in the 1980s, the extreme example of which is Thatcherism in the 
U.K.; which has been marked by both an intellectual/ideological belief in the 
superiority of the market system and a commitment to reduce the size of the 
government deficit/debt. Both of thes~ in turn giving rise to a strong privatization 
move. 
Lesser 2 notes that what has probably been of greatest influence in the 
----
1 LESSER (1991, p. 160). 
2 Ibid. 
I 







. / \ 
r~ 
.. 
FACTOR EFFICIENCY IN PAKISTANI INDUSTRY 451 
swing of the advocacy of ·private markets is the combination of the relative 
failure of some thirty years of development efforts to significantly increase 
the standard of living in developing countries, or to close the income gap 
between developing and developed countries, and the predominant role 
which governments in most developing countries have played in the devel-
opment process. In simple terms, government planning is perceived not to 
have worked, and the advocacy of markets emerges as the alternative 3 • 
For some, the identification of the alternative (versus perceived failure 
of government per se) is an ideological premise based on a dual belief that 
first, efficiency is, or should be, the paramount goal of an economy and 
second, that markets are the best available means of achieving efficiency. 
For others the market alternative is seen as a pragmatic option, a means of 
correcting the perceived failure of government planning systems and state-
owned enterprises 4 • 
As noted above our concern here is largely one of assessing efficiency 
differences between public and private firms in Pakistan. However, to con-
sider efficiency systematically it is necessary to make a distinction between 
two types of efficiency - productive and allocative. Productive efficiency is 
straight forward and refers to the type of efficiency which most lay persons 
would recognize when they use the term "efficiency". It means producing 
an output in the least cost possible way, and is secured when the firm is 
producing the output at minimum average cost. Allocative efficiency is more 
difficult to grasp. It looks at the output of a company or plant in relation to 
the output from all the other companies or plants in the economy and asks if 
the output is too much or too little given a society's preferences. The 
question is whether the plant is getting too many or too few of the scarce 
resources in the economy given what society wants. In general allocative 
efficiency is secured by ever changing competitive prices. Increased competi-
tion will (other things being equal) lead to improved allocative efficiency. 
Allocative and productive efficiency can often pull in opposite direc-
tions. For example, it was often said in the UK that the nationalized indus-
tries provided allocative efficiency because the government could impose 
competitive prices, but that this was at the expense of productive efficiency 
since there were no obvious mechanisms in the public sector to force lower 
costs'. 
With regard to productive efficiency, some argue that simply the act of 
• 
3 See for example: BERG (1987) . 
• VERNON-WORTZEL and WORTZEL (1989). 
, STEVENS (1989, p. 64). 
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moving the enterprise from the public to the private sector would improve 
productive efficiency. This assumes that public enterprises are chronically 
and universally inefficient. There are some theoretical grounds supporting 
this view associated with economic theories , of agencies 6 and public 
choice 7 • There are no empirical grounds to assume either sector is automati-
cally superior to the other. Superior performance is essentially determined 
by the environment in which the enterprise operates and the act of privatiza-
tion alone cannot be assumed to lead to productive efficiency. 
Gains to allocative efficiency. 8 - How well markets function will determine 
privatization's impact on allocative efficiency. Public enterprises operating in 
competitive markets should be privatized since there is no first or second 
best rationale for public intervention of any sort. In these cases gains in 
efficiency will be minor, since the public enterprises will have already been 
exposed to a competitive environment. These public enterprises will typi-
cally be found in the service or manufacturing sectors in areas where there 
are no scale economies and where the market can support several firms 9 • 
It would appear that the potential for important efficiency gains is to 
be found in imperfect markets or in potentially competitive markets where 
public ownership is the result of unwarranted intervention. In either case 
however, gains in allocative efficiency from privatization are unclear. In 
competitive markets, public ownership is sometimes associated with ineffi-
cient intervention: a statutory'public monopoly established in a market that 
should support several firms; a public enterprise granted protection from 
competition; or perhaps public ownership subsidized to support state distri-
butional objectives. In such cases greater efficiency gains can be expected 
from regulatory reform than from privatization itself, even though in prac-
tice the two often come together 10 • 
The likely gains in imperfect markets are similarly modest. As Hem-
ming and Mansoor argue, "allocative efficiency is a function of market 
structure rather than ownership" 11 • In the absence of other reforms that 
affect the pattern of relative prices in the economy and increase competition, 
the privatized enterprise still faces the same prices as the public enterprise 
before it. Privatization by itself will not change the nature of the market in 
• See for example VICKERS and YARROW (1988). 
7 See for example PEACOCK (1979). • 
• The following is based largely on VAN DE WALLE (1989, pp. 604-605). 
9 VAN DE WALLE (1989, p. 604). 
'
0 VAN ;,E WALLE (1989, pp. 604-605). 
11 HEMMING and MANSOOR (1988, p. 13). 
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which the firm operates, and the environment which shapes its pricing 
decisions. A public monopoly makes way for a private monopoly, for exam-
ple, but monopoly pricing will remain in effect. 
Gains to Productive Efficiency. - With some important exceptions the gains 
in allocative efficiency from divestiture are likely to be modest. The case for 
privatization then rests with the gains in productive efficiency that it will 
bring about within the firm. Privatization advocates argued that public 
enterprises are more likely to exhibit greater internal inefficiencies than 
private firms for several reasons: 
1. Public enterprises tend to misuse production inputs because they are protected 
from competition and thus allow considerable slack or "X-lnefficiencies" 12 to 
develop in their production processes. Public enterprises in many countries have 
easy access to capital, often at subsidized levels, and thus can be expected to 
undervalue capital in their investment decisions. Subsequent to privatization an 
enterprise would compete with other firms for access to capital, and use it more 
efficient! y. 
2. The property rights school argues that managerial incentives to maximize profits 
and minimize costs are undermined by public ownership and regulations 13 ; public 
managers are given numerous and inconsistent objectives by government over-
seers. Unwieldy bureaucratic controls and the absence of shareholders with a 
direct interest in profits lessening the pressure on managers to maximize company 
performance. 
Previous Estimates of Public Sector Efficiency 
How important are these inefficiencies in production? Certainly in 
Pakistan's case there are few estimates. While X-inefficiencies are assumed 
to be important in some cases, it is not clear in what proportion they result 
specifically from public ownership, rather than from protection from competi-
tion more generally. In addition because public enterprises are saddled with 
noncommercial functions, criteria for performance are more ambiguous and 
difficult to monitor effectively. Also in Pakistan's case, public enterprises 
have been burdened with employment creation or overt redistributive func-
tions. In such situations it is difficult to distinguish technology-induced 
inefficiencies from those brought OR by government social welfare ob-
jectives. 
12 LEIBENSTEIN (1966). 
13 See for example: DEMSETZ (1968) and FuRUBOTN and PE,JovICH (1972). 
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With these considerations in mind it is interesting to look at the 
previous empirical work on public/private efficiency and profitability rates. 
These studies have provided mixed pictures. In one of the first studies of 
this type Sarmad 14 selected four ratios from a choice of seventeen perform-
ance indicators (on the basis of their predictive power). This methodology 
enabled him to select, in particular, the profitability ratios most appropriate 
for performance evaluation in the prevailing market conditions. Of his find-
ings several stand out 1': 
1. Nine poorly performing enterprises were identified whose current state was the 
result of the aggravation of a declining trend in profitability which was already 
present in the earlier years of 1977-78-1981-82 period. 
2. A comparison of the operational conditions of poorly performing enterprises 
with those of the well performing ones showed that the former, labor intensities 
were much higher and factor utilization relatively unproductive. However, despite 
continuous deficits, the low-performing enterprises were not allowed to go into 
liquidation. 
3. The regression results regarding the determinants of enterprise profitability 
were just as expected. Enterprise size was found to be negatively related to the 
profit rate while for the group of smaller enterprises the relation was positive, 
suggesting a certain critical level beyond which enterprise size exerts a negative 
influence on the profit rate. 
4. The growth rate of the asset variable is significant and positively related to 
profit rate, which is explained by the increase in capacity utilization of nearly all 
public enterprises during the years from 1977-78 to 1981-82. The negative rela-
tion of leverage to the profit rate is explained by the greater risk associated with 
a higher equity-asset ratio. 
Sarmad concluded 16 that the lower profit rate in big enterprises could 
result from two causes. First such enterprises tend to have a large share of 
the total supply of the product and because of less competition have little 
incentive to improve efficiency. Secondly, given the limited size of the 
domestic market, capacity utilization in large enterprises is low, particularly 
during the earlier years of operation. Sarmad notes that while the inverse 
relationship between enterprise size and rate of profit is true in general, the 
incidence of slackness is mostly in the small asset sized group. 
As noted above, owing to multiple objectives, i.e., commercial and 
non-commercial, assessment of asset utilization in public enterprises is a 
.. SARMAD (1984). 
" SARMAD (1984, p. 153). 
16 SARMAD (1984, p. 153). 
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complex task. The most important element which influences the perform-
ance of these firms is government control on prices of their inputs and 
outputs. Barring a few manufacturing enterprises prices of almost all of the 
public enterprises in Pakistan are directly or indirectly controlled by the 
government which in turn influence their sales as well as profits 17 • 
Despite the presumption that public enterprises in Pakistan lack profita-
bility because of price controls, a recent report by the Auditor General 18 
shows that in 1987-88 the return on government investment works out to 8 
percent. The GSC report demonstrates that in 1988-89, 154 public enter-
prises' return on net shareholder equity works out to 10.4 percent. In addi-
tion, enterprises paid total taxes of Rs 25.8 billion which is 26.7 percent of 
total consolidated taxes received by the government. During the same years 
these enterprises generated a saving of Rs 24.8 billion against an investment 
of Rs 26.8 billion, leaving a gap of only Rs 2 billion i.e., 7 .7 percent. 
However, the analysis of the financial performance also shows a signifi-
cant number of negative trends 19 • 
1. Since inflation in Pakistan is approximately 9 percent and the interest rate 
around 15 percent enterprises generating less than this return on assets can be 
considered giving negative return on assets employed. There were only six enter-
prises which in 1988-89 gave a return above 15 percent and ten enterprises which 
gave returns above 10 percent. 
2. Out of 154 GSC enterprises, at least 51 units with about 12 percent assets 
incurred losses. In the manufacturing sector alone 5 units with about Rs 2 billion 
assets were closed down; and 
3. In 1988-89 out of 356 companies listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange 44 
belonged to the public sector. These companies with 56 percent share in assets 
contributed 454 percent of the sales and generated only 38 percent net profit. 
Similarly their share in corporate tax was 37 percent and the dividends at 35 
percent. 
As Mehdi 20 notes, the above findings may simply demonstrate the 
effects of the negative element of public ownership rather than inefficiency 
of management. This however, is consistent with the notion that in general 
public sector firms have higher cost structures. A primary conclusion of a 
survey of public enterprises world wide is that they have not performed up 
17 MEHDI (1991). 
18 AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN (1989) . 
.. MEHDI (1991, pp. 896-897). 
20 MEHDI (1991, p. 896). 
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to the expectations of their creators and founders 21 • In Pakistan also such 
conclusions have strengthened the case for economic reforms in which 
privatization plays a major role. 
Along these lines, LaPorte and Ahmed 22 note their starting assump-
tions concerning state ownership, the role of public enterprises in the 
economy of Pakistan, and the performance of these organizations: 23 
1. state ownership is unavoidable 
2. public enterprises play a major role in the economy of Pakistan 
3. the commercial performance of public enterprises is poor 
4. if government continues to use public enterprises, improvements in man-
agement and performance must be pursued; and 
5. alternatives to "govetnmerit" by public enterprise should be pursued. .. 
are essentially correct. 
Qualifying the third point, they note that while their results suggested 
that the public enterprise sector as a whole was not the savings generating 
sector as envisaged by its advocates, nor were many public enterprises profit 
makers; not all lost money and some not only generated savings, but made 
profits for the government. They found that public enterprises whose man-
agement systems were quite archaic or that had just begun to adopt business-
type systems, generated savings and made profits despite being over staffed. 
They do caution however that these enterprises were in economic sectors 
where they enjoyed a monopoly status, and had very high demands for their 
goods or services. In this regard, it should be noted that the principle 
examples they cite where this occurrence was common was not in manufac-
turing but the Water and Power Development Authority· (W APDA) and 
Telegraph and Telephone. 
In a much more detailed study, Shaikh examined the operational per-
formance of Pakistan's vegetable ghee industry during the ten year period 
1970-80 24 • Here the particular focus was on the trend in performance and 
relative efficiency under the two ownership periods: 2 ' 
1. In terms of the growth rate of public profitability in constant prices the period 
of study could be divided into three phases, each coinciding with a different 
21 NELLS (1990). 
22 LAPOJl.TE and AHMED (1989). 
21 LAPORTE and AHMED (1989, pp. 146-147). 
24 SHAIKH (1985). 
;, SHAIKH (1985). 
·>,1: ---.:,.,·,::~;- ,,_ 
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external control structure: high rate of growth from a very low base under private 
ownership, stagnation under the provisional governments and impressive growth 
from a relatively high base under the Ghee Corporation. 
2. In terms of average level of public profitability in constant prices, the perform-
ance of the period under public ownership was significantly better than the 
performance in the period under private ownership. 
Shaikh qualifies his findings by suggesting 26 that managerial perform-
ance under private ownership was probably better than indicated by these 
results for several reasons. First there was uncertainty in the supply of 
inputs during some years of the private period. Secondly, deliberate under-
reporting of operational performance occurred for purposes of tax evasion. 
Third, it can be argued that some of the increased production was a passive 
response to shifting demand. How the private sector would have responded 
in the absence of nationalization is something that cannot be tested. 
In spite of these qualifications, the results can be used to argue 27 
against the inevitability of lower efficiency under public ownership. The 
results also suggest the fact that it is not ownership per se but rather the 
nature of the technology, prevalent institutional arrangements and specific 
policies adopted by the government which affect performance. This fact is 
dramatically brought out by the contrast in the performances during the two 
phases of public ownership. Both the level and the rate of growth in public 
profitability in constant prices are, significantly higher for the period under 
the Ghee Corporation than for the period under the provincial governments. 
In their study of privatization Naqvi and Kemal 28.concluded that most 
of the a priori arguments in favor of privatization - e.g., that it improves 
allocative or productive efficiency by promoting greater competition, that it 
helps to raise more money for the government to help solve its budgetary 
deficit problems and that it lays the foundation of the so-called people's 
capitalism - are not convincing in Pakistan's context. 
In particular, their analysis suggests that: 29 
1. Privatization may yield modest, if any gains in allocative or productive efficien-
cy because the (private) market structures are basically oligopolistic. 
2. The public sector's profitability is due not to the higher level of protection that 
it enjoys (indeed, the effective protection rates are lower for them) nor due to 
26 SHAIKH (1985, p. 716). 
27 SHAIKH (1985, p. 716). 
28 NAQVI and KEMAL (1991). 
2
• NAQVI and KEMAL (1991, p. 131). 
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any restrictions placed on the entry of new firms, but to its better performance 
and superior productive efficiency. 
3 . The charge of the inherent inefficiency of the public industrial enterprises is 
based neither on good theory nor solid· empirical evidence. 
4. The country's stock exchanges are too thin and the small potential takers of the 
stocks of the diversified public enterprises are basically risk averters. 
From this they concluded 30 that changing the locus of ownership of 
industries is by itself neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an 
efficient operation of specific industrial enterprises. Their evidence shows 
that both the private and public sector firms have operated efficiently as 
well as inefficiently, depending on the type of industry to which they 
belong. Their results also suggest very strongly that in Pakistan, there is 
nothing inherently good or bad about the pl,lblic sector; or even about the 
private sector for that matter. Specifically they cite data showing that the 
thirty nine units out of the sixty public enterprises units' for which data is 
available have had capacity utilization rates exceeding 75 percent. This piece 
of information also confirms the fact that public sector enterprises do not 
necessarily act as monopolists (or oligopolists) restricting output and raising 
prices. 
Indeed Naqvi and Kemal's data show that in terms of production, the 
performance of the public sector corporations has been commendable 31 : 
1. That public industrial companies have not necessarily been inefficient is quite 
clear from the indicators such as pre-tax profits on new equity and the growth 
rates of output. Over the 9 years period from 1978-79 to 1987-88 the production 
increased at a rate of 8.9 percent which is no lower than the average growth rate 
of the large manufacturing sector as a whole over the period. 
2. Furthermore the average rate of return on equity of 10.0 percent (in 1987-88) 
has been no less than the average rate of interest on domestic borrowing. Indeed it 
has been significantly higher than the average inflation rate of around 6 percent 
(in 1988-89). 
Naqvi and Kemal 32 also note that the experience of the public indus-
trial enterprises shows marked variations both across industrial units within 
an industry and across different industries. These differences may have been 
caused by differences in the scale of production, the quality of management, 
and the environment in which the)f operate. The favorable impact of change 
'
0 NAQVI and KEMAL (1991, p. 131). 
" NAQVI and KEMAL (1991, pp. 131-132). 
32 NAQVI and KEMAL (1991, p. 132). 
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in management on the efficiency of operations can probably be best ex-
plained with reference to the Pakistan National Fibers (producing polyester 
fiber) which made a loss up to 1984-85, but with a change in management 
in 1985 it has turned into a profitable unit since 1985-86. The success of 
management is even more significant because over the 1986-90 period, 
there has been a substantial reduction in the protection given to the po-
lyester industry. 
Finally, Naqvi and Kemal 33 observe that privatization leads to a higher 
level of efficiency only to the extent that it enhances competition; but this 
does not always happen, because the presence of a large number of firms in 
almost all the industries where public enterprises operate offers scope for 
(monopolistic) competition. The only exception to this rule is Pakistan 
Steel, which enjoys a monopoly in most of the products it sells; though in 
certain other products it faces competition both from the private sector and 
from the imported products. Moreover, the average effective rate of protec-
tion in the public sector industries is significantly less than the average for 
the industrial sector. All of these considerations point to the conclusion that 
where industrial inefficiency is the problem, steps should be taken to im-
prove the situation regardless of the locus of ownership. The divestiture of 
public enterprises, mainly on ideological grounds to secure dubious eco-
nomic gains or to satisfy the sensibilities of donors and creditors, is certainly 
not an optimal policy. 
In summing up the previous work on public enterprise performance in 
Pakistan, it is clear that a number of issues remain unresolved. In part the 
difficulty involved in deriving some general conclusions are associated with 
the common practice of lumping all public enterprises together. Clearly the 
performance of public enterprises in manufacturing is somewhat different 
than experienced by similar firms in utilities or other sectors of the e-
conomy. 
A related issue is that conclusions concerning the performance of pub-
lic enterprises often hinges on the (somewhat arbitrary) selection of a 
measurement of profitability or efficiency. Profits, capital utilization, labor 
efficiency and the like all give somewhat different pictures of efficiency. 
Finally different studies have examined firms at different points in time. 
Obviously the economic environment in the 1970s was different enough 
from that in the 1980s to have produce~ a significant effect on firm efficien-
cy. 
In the analysis that follows we hope to overcome these problems 
through focusing exclusively on production efficiency. 
" NAOVI and l<EMAL (1991. p, 132). 
460 ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Methodology 
The data is composed of the industrial statistics provided in the annual 
Census of Manufacturing Industries 34 • The raw data by industry consists of: 
1. Number of Reporting Establishments; 
2. Value of fixed assets at the end of the year; 
3. Changes in stocks; 
4. Average daily persons engaged; 
5. Average daily Employment including contract labor-number; 
6. Average daily Employment including contract labor-cost; 
7. Industrial cost during the year; 
8. Value of production during the year; and 
9. Value added during the year. 
Each of these variables is identified by region: (a) Total Country, (b) 
Punjab, (c) Sindh, (d) NWFP and (e) Baluchistan and by ownership pat-
tern: (a) individual ownership, (b) partnership, (c) private limited company, 
(d) public limited company, (e) co-operative society, (f) federal ownership, 
(g) corporation by act of National/Provisional assembly, (h) provincial gov-
ernment establishment, (i) and local body government establishment. Indivi-
dual ownership, partnership and private limited company were aggregate to 
obtain total private firms. The remaining firms were classified as public 
sector entities. 
The industrial groups are: 




Textile, Apparel & Leather 
Manufacture of Textiles 
Wearing Apparel 
Leather and Leather Products 
Foot Wear except rubber or plastic 
Ginning and bailing of fibers 
. 
Wood, Wood Products and Furniture 
Wood, wood and Cork products 
Furniture and fixtures, not metal 
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Paper, Printing and Publishing 
Paper and Paper Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics 
Drugs and Pharmaceutical Products 
Industrial Chemicals 
Other Chemical Products 
Petroleum Refining 
Products of Petroleum Refining 
Products of Petroleum and Coal 
Rubber Products 
Plastics 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Pottery, China and Earthenware 
Glass and Glass Products 
Other non-Metallic Products 
Basic Metal Industries 
Iron and Steel 
Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 
Metal Products, Machinery, Equipment 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Non-Electrical Machinery 
Electrical Machinery and Supplies 
Transport Equipment 
Scientific and Measuring Instruments 
Photographic and Optical Goods 
Handicrafts, Sports and Others 
Handicrafts 
Sports and Athletic Goods 
Other Manufacturing 
,Rtt~p:l1%!1 .. '·iX) :iL' 
.,,:ii f.t.i4~::e;i!wu 
'';i<'l~l:~~<I' 1u jij;; L 
L ,(~ti~>! 
The basic model was estimated in a two step manner: 
461 
1. The first step involved estimating 3 ' r.wo separate factor productivity relation-
" Ordinary least squares estimates were performed. See SPSS/PC + Base System User's 
Guide, version 5.0 (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1992) for a description of the computational method. 
Data from: Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of 'Statistics, Statistics Division, Census of 
Manufacturing Industries annual editions, 1975-76 to 1986-87. 
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ships. The first, the contribution of capital (the productivity of capital) to overall 
value added, and the second the contribution of labor (the productivity of labor). 
2. On the assumption the predicted values for each of these equations represent 
the average productivity of capital (and labor), an additional step assessed the 
factors responsible for deviations from this norm. Specifically, what factors contrib-
uted to firms attaining output levels higher (and lower) than that normally asso-
ciated with a certain quantity of capital (and labor)? 
3. Operationally, 2 above involved regressing separately two sets of variables on 
the residuals from the capital/value added and labor/value added equations: the 
first set of variables consisted of other factor inputs (raw materials and labor for 
the capital equation and raw materials and capital for the labor equation), 
together with the size of the firm. 
4. The size of firms (defined in terms of capital per firm in the capital productivi-
ty equations and in terms of labor per firm for the labor productivity equations) 
was included to control for the fact that public sector firms are, on average, larger 
than their private counterparts, i.e. we wanted to eliminate the spurious correla-
tion between ownership and the size of the firm. 
5. The second set of variables consisted of a series of structural parameters: the 
effect of regional location, a time/policy dimension and finally, whether the firm 
was private or public. Here the attempt was to determine the effect of ownership 
on factor productivity after controlling for as many other factors as possible. 
Results 
Before examining the findings in detail, several qualifications are in 
order: 
1. In addition to the usual limitations of the data, several conceptual problems 
should be noted. The dependent variable is value added. It is likely that market 
imperfections will bias the results although the general direction of this bias is not 
apparent. On the one hand public firms are more likely to face less competition 
than their private counterparts (and thus have an inflated value added). On the 
other hand many of these public enterprises have their prices controlled (and thus 
have a deflated value added). 
2. The product mixes in the same industry will vary from private to public firms, 
thus the dependent variable (value added) may not be directly comparable for 
both types of firms. 
3. The labor term is average daily empfoyment per firm. The skill levels may vary 
systematically between public and private firms. 
With these limitations in mind, the analysis produced a number of 
interesting patterns (summarized in Table 1): 
a 
FACTOR EFFICIENCY IN PAKISTANI INDUSTRY 463 
1. For manufacturing as a whole (Table 1), variations in capital account for 
slightly over 75 percent of the variation in value added (equation 1). The same is 
also true for labor looked at individually. 
2. Labor, materials and size were all statistically significant in accounting for 
deviations in value added from that predicted by the stock of capital. It should be 
noted that the size variable was negative, suggesting that larger firms may not be 
as efficient as their smaller counterparts in effectively utilizing plant and capacity. 
3 .• While the regional variable was insignificant - locations in regions of descend-
ing level of development: Punjab = 1; Sindh = 2; NWFP = 3 and Baluchistan 
= 4 do not appear to systematically affect the productivity of capital - there was a 
distinct time trend. Breaking the period under consideration into four sub periods 
1976-78, the Bhutto years; 1979-81 the early Zia years = 2; 1982-84 consolida-
tion under Zia = 3; and 1985-87 = the transition towards civilian rule = 4, it 
was found this variable had a negative sign (indicating falling productivity asso-
ciated with time). 
4. Finally the ownership variable was positive and statistically significant. Since 
this variable assumed values of 1 for private and 2 for public firms, it appears that 
public ownership is associated with a more productive capital stock than that 
controlled by the private sector. 
Before we can conclude that public ownership appears to generate 
more value added per unit of capital than do comparable amounts under 
private ownership it should be noted that the overall improvement in the 
explanation of the capital residual term (Table 2, equation 1) was relatively 
minor. Even including the regional, and time variables - the adjusted r2 
term increased from 0.238 to 0.253. On the other hand this result (Table 2 
equation 3) does suggest that for manufacturing as a whole there are no 
gross inefficiencies in capital usage associated with public ownership per se. 
A somewhat similar picture emerges from the analysis of labor produc-
tivity (Table 2 equations 4, 5 and 6): 
1. Again, other factor inputs (materials and capital) together with size were statisti-
cally significant in accounting for differences in productivity. However, capital 
was significant at only the 90 percent level. As with capital, regional location 
does not appear to affect the productivity of labor. 
2. On the other hand, time was no longer a significant factor affecting productivi-
ty. More importantly the negative sign on the ownership term suggests that labor 
is more effectively utilized by private firms. 
Again it should be noted that the structural variables - region, time and 
ownership - provided only a marginal improvement in the overall explana-
tion of differences in labor productivity. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE PRODUCTIVITY OF CAPITAL 
AND LABOR IN PAKISTANI MANUFACTURING 
Factor Inputs Size Structural 
Industry 
Capital Labor Materials Region Time Public/Pr 
Total 
Manufacturing 
Capital +++ +++ --- ins --- +++ 
Labor +++ +++ --- ins ins ---
Food 
Capital +++ --- --- ins ---
Labor ins ins 
--- +++ ins 
Textiles 
Capital +++ +++ --- -- --- ins 
Labor ++ +++ --- --- ins --
Wood Products 
Capital ins ++ -- ++ -- ins 
Labor ins +++ +++ ins ins 
Paper/Publish 
Capital +++ ins --- + ins ins 
Labor ins +++ --~ ins ins --
Chemicals 
Capital +++ +++ --- ins ins + 
Labor + +++ --- ins ins ins 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
Capital ins +++ --- --- - ++ 
Labor + +++ --- ins ins -
Basic Metals 
Capital ins +++ ins ++ ins ++ 
Labor ins +++ ins +++ ins --
Metal Products/ 
Machinery 
Capital ins +++ --- +++ -- ++ 




Capital ++ ins ins ins -- ins 
Labor +++ ins --- ins ins ins 
SoURCE: Compiled from Tables 2-11. NOTES: + = positive coefficient ( + significant at 90% 
level of confidence, ++ = 95%, +++ = 99%). - = negative coefficient (-
significant at 90% level of confidence, -- = 95%, --- = 99%). 
• 
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TABLE 2 
PAKISTAN: FACTORS AFFECTING RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITY: 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
Productivity of Capital (K) 
(l) VA= 1.25 + 0.89K 
(9.20) (56.46)*** r2 (adj) = 0.754; df= 1036; F = 3187.27*** 
Analysis of Residuals (RE =\Actual-Predicted), Labor (L), Materials (MT), Size (SC) 
(2) RE = -2.81 + 0.33 L + 0.25 MT - 0.56 SC (-16.05) (7.83)*** (9.11)*** (-13.89)*** 
(0.43] )0.49] [- 0.68] 
(adj) = 0.238; df = 1034; F = 109.07**•' ''.>'!"~., 
Region (RG), Time Period (TP), Ownership-Public/Private (PS) ~ 
(3) RE =-2.49 + 0.25 L + 0.27 MT - 0.57 SC - 0.05 RG - 0.19 TP + 0.20PS (5.70)*** (9.69)*** (-12.64)*** (~1.53) (-3.68)*** (2.26)** 
[0.36] ;o.481 [-0.691 [-0.04] r-0.101 
(adj) = 0.253; df = 1031; F = 59.47*** 
[0.11] 
Productivity of Labor (L) 
(4)VA = 2.96 + 1.27 L 
(29.44) (60.01)*** r2 (adj) = 0.776; df = 1036; F = 3601.02*** 
Analysis of Residuals (RE =i Actual-Predicted), Capital (K), Materials (MT), Size tSLY 
(5)RE = -2.74 + 0.05K + 0.41 MT - 0.63SL 
(-17.62) (1.90)* (14.34)*** (-17.61)*** 
[0.11] {0.76] [-0.65] 
F = 119.92*** r2 (adj) = 0.256; df = 1034; '. 
Region (RG), Time Period (TP), Ownership-Public/Private (PS) 
(6) RE =-2.93 + 0.06 K + 0.42 MT - 0.56 SL - 0.04 RG + 0.07 TP - 0.25 P.\ (2.07)** (14.60)*** (-11.32)*** (1.34) (1.35) (-3.40)** 
1::\ [0.13] [0.781 [- 0.58] [0.041 lQ.041 [-0.14] 
.··;. 
r2(adJ) = 0.266; df= 1031; F = 63.56 
NOTES: Ordinary least squares estimates. r2 (adj) = adjusted coefficient of determination; F = 
F Statistic; df = degrees of freedom; ( ) = t statistic with: ••• significant at the 99% 
level; ** significant at the 95% level; * significant at the 90% level. [ ] = standardized 
coefficients; VA = value added; K = value of fixed assets; L = Average daily 
employment; MT = cost of materials. VA, K, L and MT are in natural logarithms and 
on a per firm basis. RG = regional dummy variable with Punjab = 1, Sind = 2, 
NWFP = 3 and Baluchistan = 4. PS = ownership dummy with private firms = 1 
and public firms = 2. There are two size variables. SC is defined in terms of the firm's 
capital stock with value less than 5 million Rs = 1; 5 million to 10 million = 2, 10 
million to 50 million = 3 and greater than 50 million = 4; SL is defined in terms of 
the workforce per firm with less than 25 workers = 1; 25 to 100 = 2; 100-500 = 3 
and greater than 500 = 4. Time period (TP) reflects the evolving political/economic 
environment toward less state interventi011 with 1976-78 = 1; 1979-81 = 2; 1982-84 
= 3; and 1985-87 = 4. 
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To determine the generality of these patterns, similar regressions were 
performed on the value added of other major industrial groupings. While 
space does not permit a detailed accounting of each main division 9f 
manufacturing, several findings are of particular interest. For the food indus-
try (Table 3 ): 
1. By itself variations in capital accounted for about 50 per cent of the observed 
differences in value added (Equation 1, Table 3 ). In contrast, labor accounted for 
over 86 percent in the differences in value added between firms (Table 3, Equa-
tion 4). 
2. In contrast to manufacturing as a whole, regional location appears to play an 
important role in affecting the productivity of capital (Equation 3, Table 3). Here 
the negative sign indicates that plants located in the less developed regions -
NWFP and Baluchistan utilize capital less efficiently than their counterparts in the 
more developed parts of the country - Punjab and Sind. 
3. While there appears to be no productivity effects associated with time, the 
ownership variable is negative (Table 3, Equation 3 ), suggesting that capital is 
used relatively ineffectively by public firms. 
4. As noted, labor is much more important than capital in accounting for differ-
ences in value added between firms in the food industry.· Furthermore, capital 
and materials appear to be insignificant in accounting for differences in value 
added across firms (Equation 5, Table 2). 
5. Although labor productivity differences across firms can not be explained by 
the relative use of supporting resources (capital and materials) several structural 
variables do play a role. In particular, firms in the more developed regions have 
labor productivity levels above their counterparts in the more backward areas of 
the country. In addition, there appears to be a general increase in labor produc-
tivity with time. 
6. Finally, although public firms in the food industry appear to use capital less 
efficiently than their private sector counterparts, they are not at a disadvantage 
with regard to the utilization of labor (Table 3, Equation 6). 
For the remaining industries, several general patterns emerge: 
1. Industrial inputs-materials, fuel and the like are consistently quite significant in 
affecting the productivity of labor and capital. 
2. Regional location appears to be a bit more important in determining the produc-
tivity of capital rather than labor, although there are several exceptions to this 
rule. The main pattern here is one whereby if regionaf location affects the produc-
tivity of one factor it generally also does so for the other. 
3. There does not appear to be a regional pattern with regard to the common 
definition of industries into light (food, textiles, wood, paper and handicrafts) and 
heavy (chemicals, non-metallic minerals, basic metals and metal products). Locat-
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TABLE 3 
PAKISTAN: FACTORS AFFECTING RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITY: 
Tiffi FOOD INDUSTRY 
Productivity of Capital (K) ·1·;1--; 
(1) VA= -0.42 + 1.15K 
(-0.46) (11.99)*** r2 (adj) = 0.499; df = 142; F = 143.73*** 
Analysis of Residuals (RE = Actual-Predicted), Labor (L), Size (SC) 
(2) RE = - 3.87 + 1.25 L - 1.11 SC ., 
(11.02)***(-7.81)*** 
[1.15] [-0.82] ·' 
r2 (adj) = 0.463; df = 141; F = 62.59*** 
Region (RG), Time Period (TP), Ownership-Public/Private (PS) 
(3)RE =-3.53 + 0.41 L - 1.06SC - 0.29RG + 0.24 TP - 0.56PS (10.81)*** (- 7.00)*** (-3.13)*** (1.43) (-2.85)*** ' 
" [1.30] [-0.78] [-0.19] [0.90] [-0.22] 
. i: 
r2 (adj) = 0 . .503; df = 138; F = 29.98*** , .. \. 
,.,,_,J 
Productivity of Labor (L) 
(4) VA= 2.92 + 1.42L 
(11 . .53) (29.91)*** r2 (adj) = 0.863; df = 142; F = 894.57*** 
Analysis of Residuals (RE = Actual-Predicted), Capital (K), Materials (MT) 
(5) RE = 1.07 - 0.03 K - 0.07 MT ; 
(1.90) (-0.37) (-0.80) 
[-0.05] [-0.11] 
r2 (adj) = 0.012; df = 141; F = 1.87 
Region (RG), Time Period (TP), Ownership-Public/Private (PS) 
(6) RE = 1.52- 0.13 K- 0.06MT- 0.22RG + 0.37 TP + 0.26PS - ! ; '1·.:~ 
(-1.4.5) (-0.58) (-3.31)*** (3.30)*** (1.19) 
' 
[-0.21] [-0.09] [-0.26] [0.27] [0.16] 
r2 (adj) = 0.1~8; . df = 138; F = 5.21*** 
::_, .. 
' 
NOTES: same as Table 2. ::11~ 
ing in the poorer regions tends to reduce• the productivity of capital in food, 
textiles, and non-metallic minerals, but increases it in wood products, paper, basic 
metals and metal products industries. 
4. In general, capital became less productive over time. That is for those industries 
where time had a statistically significant effect on the productivity of capital it was 
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always in a negative direction. Labor productivity in food was the only case where 
output per unit of a factor increased systematically with the passage of time. For 
all other industries, labor productivity does not appear to have varied systematical-
ly with time. 
5. As noted for industries as a whole, public firms appear to utilize capital more 
effectively than their private cpunterparts. However, this is offset a bit in several 
cases by the fact that these firms use labor less efficiently. It should be noted that 
this relationship between state ownership and capital productivity is confined 
largely to the heavier industries, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, basic metals 
and metal products industries. As such this result is a bit surprising given the fact 
that public firms usually use considerably more capital per unit of labor than that 
associated with private production. 
6. Possibly a related pattern involves the inability of heavy industries - non-
metallic minerals, basic metals and metal products/machinery - to increase capital 
productivity per firm though increasing the number of supporting workers per 
firm. This pattern suggests relatively fixed technical coefficients for these firms, 
leaving management and organization as the mainly responsible for overall capital 
productivity. 
7. In contrast capital productivity in the lighter industries (with the exception of 
wood products) is increased considerably with the addition of additional workers. 
Conclusions 
The analysis undertaken above was largely concerned with those areas 
where the gains from privatization in Pakistan are likely to produce im-
provements in productive efficiency (as opposed to allocative efficiency). In 
general the main findings noted above are consistent with those of Naqvi 
and Kemal, and suggest that privatization per se may not provide the signifi-
cant increases in output and productivity predicted by advocates of these 
programs. 
If the government continues to move ahead with privatization in manu-
facturing, its best strategy would seem to be selective privatization in the 
lighter manufacturing areas such as food and textiles. Although even here 
the work noted on the vegetable ghee industry suggests that the gains from 
privatization may be minimal. In any case, the lighter manufacturing indus-
tries should be examined carefully before moving on to the heavier indus-
tries where there are significant g:tins in productivity. 
The general increases in output that might be expected from increased 
capital efficiency in the lighter manufacturing areas should also be rein-
forced if the privatization movement also reduces through further divesti-
ture the overall size of firms. Also the most productive areas to explore for 
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privatization in the food and textiles industries appear to be in the more 
underdeveloped regions - NWFP and Baluchistan. 
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IL FATTORE EFFICIENZA NELL'INDUSTRIA PAKISTANA: L'INFLUEN-
ZA DELLA PROPRIETA PRIVATA E PUB.BLICA SULLA PRODUTTIVITA 
DEL CAPITALE EDEL LAVORO 
Lo scopo di questo articolo e di esaminare le possibili influenze economiche 
della privatizzazione nel Pakistan. In particolare, stabilire se le imprese private 
dell'industria pakistana sono piu efficienti delle imprese corrispondenti nel setto-
re pubblico e, in caso affermativo, in che modo. La conclusione e che la privatizza-
zione in se puo non portare i significativi aumenti di produzione e produttivita 
che i sostenitori di questi programmi asseriscono. Se ii governo continua sulla 
strada della privatizzazione nelle industrie, la miglior strategia sembrerebbe esse-
re una privatizzazione selettiva nei settori industriali leggeri come l'alimentare e 
ii tessile. 
<'W!; ~<~!''1>"!.'? ~.ttS-'l'.·.'i'J~.t;, .~-~h 
"\-+J'<'·~li ~~·~\;:\.~~\\ :/",~~· ~~< 
.!!· 
~ ! 
..:-< 
.. 
' 
"" 
j} 
... 
\,.. 
:.. 
